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Introduction
The principle of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is the basis of the law of 
divorce of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“LRA”) of Malaysia 
and Divorce Reform Act 1969/Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (“MCA”) of 
England and Wales. In England and Wales, this is the sole ground for divorce. 
Malaysian law has, in addition, made conversion of one of the parties to Islam 
(s 51) and mutual consent (s 52) as grounds for divorce. Both jurisdictions 
emphasise the possibility of reconciliation between the spouses that may 
save the marriage. In England, the application of the provisions concerning 
reconciliation and conciliation under the MCA had faced difficulty since it 
came into force. This led to the reformation of the MCA into Family Law Act 
1996 (“FLA”) especially provisions relating to the practice of reconciliation 
and conciliation, where mediation takes centre stage. The LRA however, 
remains the same today as it was introduced in 1976. Thus, the aim of this 
article is to review this aspect of the law, as the LRA of Malaysia is based, 
with some modifications, on the MCA of England. It is hoped that this article 
will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the reconciliation provisions 
of both countries, i.e. Malaysia and England, with a view towards a better 
legal provision on reconciliation in the future.
Background to the Divorce Acts of Malaysia and England
In England, there were two important Acts on dissolution of marriage and 
its reconciliation prior to the enactment of the current FLA, i.e. the Divorce 
Reform Act 1969 (“DRA”) and the MCA. The DRA, which came into force 
on January 1, 1971, was the outcome of a compromise between a group 
established by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Law Commission.1 The 
 *  Assistant Professor, Ahmad Ibrahim Kulliyyah of Laws, International Islamic University 
Malaysia. Email address: ahnora@iiu.edu.my.
 1 The Law Commission was established by the Law Commissions Act 1965 which requires 
the Commission, consisting of five lawyer Commissioners and assisted by a support staff, to 
take and keep the law under review, to see to its “systematic development and reform” and 
to work towards the simplification and modernisation of the law. It is said that for nearly 30 
years family law was one of the most important and productive areas of the Commission’s 
work and the Commission could justly regard its record of achievement in this area as a 
“formidable success story”. See, Cretney, S, Law, Law Reform and the Family, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1998, p 1.
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Group recommended the abolition of all existing grounds for divorce and 
their replacement by a single ground i.e. breakdown of marriage.2 The court 
would be charged with conducting an investigation of the current marital 
circumstances in order to discover whether the marriage was still viable and 
fault as the basis for divorce was to be abandoned.3 The Law Commission 
agreed that reform of the law was desirable, but it rejected the view that the 
court should carry out a full inquest into the alleged breakdown because it 
was thought that a detailed inquiry would inevitably cause humiliation and 
distress.4
After discussion, the Archbishop’s group and the Law Commission agreed 
that all the old grounds for divorce should be abolished and be replaced by 
one ground, which was: the marriage had irretrievably broken down. This, 
however, could only be established by proof of one or more of five facts5 set 
out in the Act (s 2(1)). As the result of both reports, a number of alternatives 
were submitted based on the assumption that a good divorce law should 
seek to achieve two aims:
 (i)  To buttress, rather than to undermine, the stability of marriage; and
 (ii)  When, regrettably, a marriage has irretrievably broken down, to 
enable the empty legal shell be destroyed with maximum fairness, and 
minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation.6
Passingham in his book The Divorce Reform Act 1969 states that, “the first 
objective of the DRA required that divorce should not be so easy that the parties 
should have no incentive to make a success of their marriage to overcome 
temporary difficulties”. He then said, “it also required that everything possible 
should be done to encourage reconciliation”.7
The DRA as set out in its Long Title was “to facilitate reconciliation in 
matrimonial causes”.8 Thus it contains a number of provisions aimed at 
 2 The Archbishop’s group in the report described the fault-based principle as “quite simply, 
inept”: it failed to either uphold the sanctity of marriage or to offer a humane system for 
its termination. See, “Putting Asunder”, A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society, London: 
SPCK, 1966, para 45.
 3 See, “Putting Asunder”, A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society, London: SPCK, 1966, para 
84.
 4 See, Lord Chancellor, Reform of the Grounds of Divorce, the Field of Choice, 1966, Cmnd No 
3123; See also, Roger, B and Cretney, S, Divorce—the New Law, Family Law, Bristol, 1996, p 
1; Cretney, S, Family Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 4th edn, 2000, p 51.
  Three of the facts are akin to the matrimonial offences of adultery, cruelty and desertion. 
The other two are proof that the parties had been separated for five years, but two years if 
they agreed to a divorce.
 6 Lord Chancellor, Reform of the Grounds of Divorce, the Field of Choice, Cmnd No 3123, para 
15.
 7 Passingham, B, The Divorce Reform Act 1969, Butterworths, London, 1970, p iii.
 8 See, DRA.
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ensuring that the parties shall not be deterred from attempts at reconciliation 
by the fear that, should these attempts fail, they will be fatal to the chances of 
a subsequent petition for divorce.9 However, there were opinions expressing 
reservations on the applicability of the provisions for example, EJ Griew in 
his article, “Marital Reconciliation—Contexts and Meanings” states s 3 of the 
DRA “as an inadequate instrument for giving effect to it”.10
The provisions designed to promote reconciliation as contained in the DRA 
were later consolidated into the MCA. It was said that although the MCA 
brought extensive reforms to the law governing matrimonial causes, it was 
unfortunate that the first objective of the Law Commission that was to buttress, 
rather than to undermine, the stability of marriage, had not been realised.11 
This is partly due to the almost complete failure of procedure designed to 
encourage reconciliation.12
In Malaysia, divorce for the non-Muslims was, before the passing of the LRA, 
regulated and conditioned by the philosophy of the religion of the spouses and 
the customary law that governed them. In the case Re Ding Do Ca,13 Thomson 
CJ expressed the hope that questions relating to the family law:
… be settled beyond doubt by legislation which will clearly express the 
modern mores of the classes of persons concerned and put the rights of the 
individuals beyond the chances of the litigation.
Due to the unsatisfactory state of affairs14 in the law concerning marriage and 
divorce and the need to review the laws in this area,15 in 1970, the Yang di-
 9 DRA, ss 3(3)–(6).
 10 Griew, E J, “Marital Reconciliation—Context of Meanings” [1972A] CLJ 294. 
 11 Passingham, B, Law and Practice in Matrimonial Causes, Butterworth & Co Ltd, 3rd edn, 1979, 
p 3–6.
 12 Ibid.  
 13 [1966] 2 MLJ 220. 
 14 Examples of dissatisfaction are, among others, the registration of marriage was not 
compulsory under the old laws; there were no statutory provisions for reconciliation and 
conciliation, and polygamous marriage was still recognised although it had long been 
abolished in the countries where it originated. In the case of Re Loh Toh Met [1961] MLJ 
234, it was held that a Chinese Christian could elect as a Christian whether to contract 
a monogamous marriage or to form a valid polygamous marriage union or unions in 
accordance with his personal law. See, for further details Zaleha Kamaruddin, Introduction 
to Divorce Laws in Malaysia, International Islamic University Malaysia Cooperative Ltd, 1998, 
pp 83–87; Ahmad Ibrahim, Family Law in Malaysia, Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 1997, 
pp 1–; Mehrun Siraj, “Conciliation Procedures in Divorce Proceedings” [196] MLJ 7, No 
2, p 317. 
 15 See, Zaleha Kamaruddin, Introduction to Divorce Laws in Malaysia, International Islamic 
University Malaysia Cooperative Ltd, 1998, pp 83–87; Ahmad Ibrahim, Family Law in 
Malaysia, Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 1997, pp 1–8; Liew, CH, “Reform of the Law 
Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976”, 7th Malaysian Law Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 
October 31 to November 2, 1983, pp 386–9.
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Pertuan Agong appointed five persons16 as members of the Royal Commission 
on Non-Muslim Marriage and Divorce laws.17 In 1975, the Bill went through the 
tortuous stages of Parliamentary debates and became law in 1976. Subsequent 
to that date, the LRA was amended on several occasions.18 It was only in 
March 1982 that the LRA came into force.19 It has included the provisions on 
reconciliation and conciliation in Parts VI and IX and these provisions are 
based on the reconciliation provisions in the English MCA.
Comparative overview of the reconciliation provisions of LRA and MCA
(i)  Definition
In England, Report of the Committee on One-Parent Families 1974 has 
defined reconciliation as “the reuniting of the spouses”. The Finer Committee 
distinguishes reconciliation, “the action of reuniting persons who are estranged” 
from conciliation, “the process of engendering common sense, reasonableness 
and agreement in dealing with the consequences of estrangement”.20 Nicholas 
Tyndall, the Chief Officer of the National Marriage Guidance Council, wrote 
in an article in the Law Society’s Gazette:
Reconciliation is a far wider process than merely the uniting of estranged 
partners. Clearly it is successful if it reunites partners or prevents separation. 
But it is also successful if it reconciles individuals to the necessity of divorce 
and their lonely future, if it removes stress or panic at the moment of 
decision-making, if it assists estranged couples in making more satisfactory 
arrangements for children and if it helps confused individuals through the 
break-up of their marriage.
There is no definition of reconciliation under the LRA of Malaysia. However, 
since the Malaysian divorce court is required under s 47 of the Act to “act and 
give relief on principles which in the opinion of the court are, as nearly as 
may be, conformable to the principles on which the High Court of England 
acts and gives relief in matrimonial proceedings”,21 it is presumed that the 
same definition of reconciliation is utilised.
 16 The members appointed were Miss PG Lim, Mr Justice M Shanker, Puan Sri Rosalind YC 
Foo and Datin Janaki Athi Nahappan with the late Tan Sri Ong Hock the then Chief Justice 
as the chairman.
 17 [1970] 1 MLJ xxxvii.
 18 The original Bill was redrafted to take account of the recommendations of the Joint Select 
Committee and at this stage the latest English law on divorce was referred to, i.e. MCA.
 19 See, Ahmad Ibrahim, Family Law in Malaysia, Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 1997, p 6.
 20	 Report	of	the	Committee	on	One-Parent	Families, 1974, Cmnd No 5629, vol 1, para 4.288. 
 21 LRA, s 47; unlike under the Civil Law Act 196, where specific dates have been given, s 47 
does not identify a date at which principles enunciated by the High Court of Justice in England 
would apply in Malaysia. In the case of Re Divorce Petition Nos 18, 20 & 24 of 1983 [1984] 2 MLJ 
158, Shankar J opined that s 47 must be read, “in a contemporaneous context and if applied 
must refer to the corresponding position in England today”. See, Mimi Kamariah, Family Law 
in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 1999, pp 148–149.
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(ii)  Adjournment of proceedings
Both LRA and MCA have identical provision for the adjournment of 
proceedings for divorce.
The provisions of both Acts state:
[I]f at any stage of proceedings for divorce it appears to the court that there 
is a reasonable possibility of a reconciliation between the parties to the 
marriage, the court may adjourn the proceedings for such period as it thinks 
fit to enable attempts to be made to effect such a reconciliation.
The provision as set out clearly aimed at saving marriages, however small 
the possibility it may seem to be. On this provision, Bromley in his book The 
Family Law commented, “it is of no practical importance at all”.22 According 
to him this is simply because if the case is undefended, the court will not have 
the opportunity to know whether reconciliation is possible. A defended case 
would be very unlikely to have a successful reconciliation except in the most 
exceptional circumstances.23
Bromley’s statement is true as far as undefended cases are concerned. In 
defended cases the provision clearly states that adjournment should take place 
only if the court considers there is possibility of reconciliation and not in all 
contested cases. Thus, this section is still useful and practical particularly in 
cases with chances of reconciliation.
In Malaysia, where the divorce is on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown 
there is a compulsory reference of matrimonial problem to a conciliatory 
body appointed under s 106 of LRA where the parties attend without their 
lawyers.24 This mandatory requirement of reconciliation takes place prior 
to the filing of a petition for divorce. This has been severely criticised. The 
Bar Council in its meeting in 1982 suggested that reconciliation should not 
be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for divorce.25 It is claimed 
that this compulsory reference has created a situation where interim orders 
are not immediately available because one is barred from petitioning for a 
divorce without the conciliatory body’s certificate and interim proceedings are 
an important part of divorce proceedings. As a result, the legal practitioners 
have to look to other sources of law and procedure to protect the parties and 
children involved.26
 22 Bromley, PM and Lowe, NV, Family Law, 7th edn, Butterworths, 1998, p 210.
 23 Ibid.
 24 LRA, s 106.
 25 The Bar Council Meeting, April 1982.
 26 Ibid. 
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(iii)  Solicitor’s certificate
Section 6(1) of the MCA states:
Provision shall be made by rules of court for requiring the solicitor acting 
for a petitioner for divorce certificate whether he has discussed with the 
petitioner the possibility of a reconciliation and given him the names and 
addresses of persons qualified to help effect a reconciliation between parties 
to a marriage who have become estranged.
However, s (1) of the LRA has different wording:
Provision may be made by rules of court for requiring that before the 
presentation of a petition for divorce the petitioner shall have recourse to the 
assistance and advice of such persons or bodies as may be made available 
for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between parties to a marriage 
who have become estranged.
The English law requires that the certificate filed by the solicitor for the 
petitioner to state whether he has, or has not, discussed with the petitioner 
the possibility of a reconciliation and has, or has not, given him the names and 
addresses of persons qualified to help to effect a reconciliation.27 The object 
of this provision is to ensure that the parties know where to seek guidance 
when there is a sincere desire for a reconciliation.28 However, it was said that 
in England the provision was generally regarded as serving little purpose 
as many applicants for a divorce do not instruct their solicitors to do so as 
it was not compulsory. It had therefore been suggested that s 6(1) should be 
repealed.29
O’Donovan comments that the choice of the word “whether” in the English 
legislation, rather than the word “that” was a crucial one, which leaves 
reconciliation to the discretion of the solicitor, rather than as a duty on the 
court, as in Malaysian legislation.30
In promoting reconciliation, the Malaysian Act requires an active role of the 
court to compel the petitioner to have recourse to the assistance and advice of 
such persons or bodies as may be made available for the purpose of effecting 
a reconciliation.31 It is within the intention of this section that attempts by 
relatives to reconcile the parties should also be accepted other than the official 
 27 The Matrimonial Causes Rule 1977, r 12(3).
 28 Practice Direction [197] 2 All ER 384; [197] 1 WLR 787; see also, Passingham, B, The Divorce 
Reform Act 1969, Butterworths, 1970, pp 279–280.
 29 The Booth Report, HMSO, 198, paras 4.42–4.43. 
 30 O’Donovan, K, “Conciliation and Reconciliation on Divorce in Hooker” MB (ed), Malaysian 
Legal Essays in Honour of Professor Emeritus Datuk Ahmad Ibrahim, Malayan Law Journal Sdn 
Bhd, 1986, p 43.
 31 LRA, s 55 (1).
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conciliatory bodies as specified under s 106(3) of the Act. Shanker J, in the 
case of In re Divorce Petitions Nos 18, 20 & 24 of 198332 agrees that:
As to the steps to be taken to effect a reconciliation referred to by s 7(2) surely 
reference to a conciliatory body is not the only way to effect a reconciliation. 
The in-laws and near relatives, dependants, friends and solicitors themselves 
could have tried to effect a rapprochement.
It was held in the case of C v A33 that:
[T]o prevent injustice it is appropriate for this court to hold that attempts 
by relatives to reconcile the parties ought to be accepted and read together 
with s 55 and proviso (vi) to s 106 of the Act.
It is not clear to what extent English law recognises the efforts of the relatives 
in the reconciliation process. Unlike the provision in the Malaysian law, there 
is no provision for recourse to the assistance and advice of such persons or 
bodies for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation in the English law. There 
was also no reported case, to the knowledge of the author, where the court 
recognises the involvement of relatives in reconciliation effort.
(iv)  Cohabitation
Under the MCA, there are certain provisions, which are designed to enable 
the parties to try to effect a reconciliation by resuming cohabitation for a 
limited period without prejudicing their right to petition for divorce if the 
attempt fails. These provisions are provided for under ss 2(1) to () of the 
MCA. It had been criticised that these provisions were not adequate to effect 
a reconciliation between the couple. However, the Malaysian Act does not 
have similar provisions concerning cohabitation of the parties with a view 
of possibility of a reconciliation.
Divorce reform in England
As a result of the dissatisfaction over the practice of reconciliation provisions 
and grounds for divorce, various reports and reviews such as the Finer 
Report 1974 and the Booth Committee 198 were made with suggestions for 
improvement. This has taken place especially in the seventies and eighties, 
which led to the Law Commission’s decision to review the current divorce 
law and published its discussion paper. In 1995, based on the discussion 
paper, the Government published the Consultation paper entitled Looking to 
the Future, Mediation and Grounds for Divorce. A key aspect of the Government’s 
proposal is that they will introduce comprehensive mediation as part of the 
 32 [1984] 2 MLJ 158.
 33 [1998] 6 MLJ 222.
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divorce process.34 Among the benefits of these proposals are that they will 
introduce a system which is better in identifying saveable marriages, making 
available every opportunity to explore reconciliation even after the divorce 
process has started and allowing couples to make workable arrangements 
through family mediation in respect of their children, home and other matters 
following a separation or divorce. This has finally resulted in the enactment 
of the FLA.
Section 1(b) of the FLA states:
[T]hat the parties to a marriage which may have broken down are to be 
encouraged to take all practicable steps, whether by marriage counselling 
or other, to save the marriage.
According to Brown in ADR Principles and Practice, there is a duty to keep the 
possibility of reconciliation under review throughout mediation. However, 
this does not create an obligation to use the mediation to try to achieve 
reconciliation. He said that if the mediator considers that possibilities of 
reconciliation exist, this should be explored.35
On a similar note, in Malaysia, reconciliation provisions were enacted in 
the LRA and came into force in 1982. Since then the provisions concerning 
reconciliation have been the subject of concerns and complaints. There has 
been a public outcry over the requirement that the parties must go through 
conciliatory proceeding before they can file a petition for divorce. Mimi 
Kamariah in Family Law in Malaysia pointed out that although the intention 
behind the reconciliation requirement in the LRA is noble and worthy, there 
are problems and difficulties related to this requirement. She argues that in 
the Malaysian society, where familial ties are still fairly strong, parties whose 
marriages are facing difficulties would invariably seek help from members 
within the family circle. Only when that fails, the parties would consult a 
lawyer to get advice on the next step. Thus, the final decision of the parties 
to go ahead with the petition for divorce usually signals the absence of any 
likelihood of a reconciliation.
 34 This White Paper abolishes “fault” in divorce itself. Under the new law, divorce will be granted 
after one or both parties had attended a group information session and had indicated an 
intention to divorce. They must wait for a year before they can file the divorce petition. 
During this period the parties are expected to reconsider whether their marriage can be 
saved and if not, they should face the consequences of their decision to divorce and make 
arrangements for their future apart. See, Sclater, Shelley Day, “A Critical Approach to the 
White paper on Divorce Reform” [1995] Web JCLI 2.
 35 Brown, H and Marriot, A, ADR Principles and Practice, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1993, 
p 238.
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Some issues in the reconciliation practice in Malaysia
The success or failure of reconciliation practices in Malaysia can only be 
judged after all the necessary problems related to it are identified and 
resolved as far as possible. There are certain issues concerning the practice 
of reconciliation that need to be examined. These are issues of practice of 
the reconciliatory/conciliatory bodies such as the lack of popularity of the 
reconciliation and conciliation institutions; wilful non-attendance by the spouse 
to the reconciliation meeting; ambiguities and defects in the law; absence of 
a provision for secrecy; lack of publicity; and administrative problem. These 
issues are discussed below.
(i)  Lack of popularity of the conciliation institutions
It has been said that the lack of popularity of the conciliation institutions is 
attributed to the cultural background of the couple themselves.36 Among the 
non-Muslims in Malaysia, reconciliation effort, prior to the LRA, was mainly 
undertaken by family elders and friends in the event of any estrangement 
between the parties.37 In some cases, religious institutions also assume an 
important role in reconciliation. However, there is no formal structure as at 
present.38 In traditional Chinese society, they prefer to settle their disputes 
by an amicable settlement using a third party as the mediator. They were 
influenced by Confucian thought, which values moral principles and has 
little regard for legal measures.39 It was said that:
Culturally the common law justice system runs counter to the rural Chinese 
Malaysian beliefs. The English judicial process requires of a judge a verdict 
rather than a compromise solution. This necessarily excludes the Confucian 
concept of yielding and compromise …40
Goh Bee Chen41 found that it is a shame for a Chinese family if the couple 
takes their marital problems to the court for settlement. Most Chinese families 
 36 See, Sitravelu, Mary Nesarajam, “Conciliatory Bodies in Klang and Petaling Jaya”, Academic 
Exercise, Faculty of Law, Unversity of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
 37 Reddy, Rita, “Reconciliation and Family Court”, a paper presented at the Conference on the 
Reform of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, IIUM, 1992, p 4; see also, Goh Bee 
Chen, “The Traditional Chinese Concept of Law, Justice and Dispute Settlement”, Academic 
Exercise, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
 38 Reddy, Rita, “Reconciliation and Family Court”, a paper presented at the Conference on 
the Reform of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, IIUM, 1992, pp 4–; Zaleha 
Kamaruddin, Introduction to Divorce Laws in Malaysia, International Islamic University 
Malaysia Cooperative Ltd, 1998, p 143.
 39 Goh Bee Chen, “The Traditional Chinese Concept of Law, Justice and Dispute Settlement”, 
Academic Exercise, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1983, p 204; see 
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adhere to the concept of “kang-ching” (good relationship), thus they will try 
their best to resolve the problem among themselves within the family without 
seeking outside assistance.42
As for the Indians in Malaysia, before the enactment of the LRA, there were 
no specific rules governing the grounds and forms of Hindu customary 
divorce. Thus, in this matter they practised their own religious usages and 
rites, which originated from their homeland India.43 It is observed that the 
same culture that prevails among the Chinese is also practised among the 
Indian community in Malaysia. Like the Chinese, Indians, too, prefer to settle 
the dispute without going to the court.44 The Indian couple who is in dispute 
normally approaches the elders in the family or in the community such as the 
local religious head or community leader for the settlement of their dispute.45 
Thus, they also prefer the assistance of an informal third party to resolve 
intra-familial problems.
Perhaps it is relevant to look into the similar practice of marital dispute 
resolution among the Malay community in Malaysia. According to Sharifah 
Zaleha,46 the Malay couple prefers the assistance of informal mediators who 
are their own relatives to resolve the family disputes between them. She 
finds that other than a relative, a disputing party might approach the local 
imam (leader in the prayer), the ketua kampung (village leader), the penghulu 
(district head) or other community leaders such as the members of the village 
committee and the local politicians to help solve their difficulties.47 This 
process is done privately in which the third party will approach one of the 
parties to discuss the problems in a more neutral way. Sharifah Zaleha48 in her 
research also discovers that direct confrontation between the two dissenting 
parties was rare. 
 42 Sharifah Zaleha, et al, Managing	Marital	Disputes	in	Malaysia-Islamic	Mediators	and	Conflict	
Resolution in the Shariah Courts, Curzon Press Ltd, p 61, observes that the similar situation 
also prevails in the Malay society in Malaysia. She states:
Malays, as previously stated, ideally want to keep the occurrence of a conflict in the 
family a secret or at least limit knowledge of the state of things to just a few people. 
However, going to the official channels to settle a dispute implies that the party who 
does so is nevertheless willing to bring the dispute to public attention. Thereby his 
opponent is brought to shame and therefore eventually does not pursue the dispute 
any longer.
 43 Zaleha Kamaruddin, Introduction to Divorce Laws in Malaysia, International Islamic University 
Malaysia Cooperative Ltd, 1998, p 78.
 44 Zaleha Kamaruddin, Isu-Isu	Kekeluargaan	dan	Undang-undang, ABIM, Kuala Lumpur, 1997, 
p 194.
 45 Ibid. 
 46 Sharifah Zaleha, et al, Managing	Marital	Disputes	in	Malaysia-Islamic	Mediators	and	Conflict	
Resolution in the Shariah Courts, Curzon Press Ltd, p 60.
 47 Ibid; Wall, James A, et al, in their study on the “Malaysian Community Mediation”, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, Beverly Hill, 1999, find the combination of civil and religious leaders 
in mediation in Malaysia a unique and interesting characteristic. 
 48 Ibid.
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Mary Nesarajam49 in her research points at the reasons for the lack of popularity 
of the conciliatory councils set up under s 106(3)(a) of the LRA. According 
to her, among the reasons is that the couple feels uncomfortable divulging 
their marital problem to members of religious groups. She states that as 
religious councils are very close-knit groups, the couple may feel ashamed 
“to wash their dirty linen” in front of righteous and upright members of the 
community. She also states that the couple may be afraid that the religious 
bodies and organisations are religious fundamentalists who will try to save 
a marriage at all cost.
(ii)  Non-attendance of the parties
It is observed that the general complaint of the members of the marriage 
tribunal is that the respondent wilfully refuses to attend the session although 
a notice has been served.50 There is a very high incidence of non-attendance 
by the respondent and sometimes even the petitioner himself fails to attend 
the session.51 The practice is that when the respondent refuses to attend, the 
Marriage Tribunal sends as many as three to four letters calling the respondent 
to the hearing.52 Some members of the Tribunal said that they suspect the 
petitioner is giving a false address to them.53 Mimi Kamariah,54 on the other 
hand, points at the difficulties in securing the attendance of all members of 
the conciliatory body on the appointed dates. As a result, there have been 
frequent postponements of the hearing session. 
Another problem in the law as regards non-attendance is that irrespective 
of whether or not the couple attends the session, the chairman has to issue 
a certificate at the end of the six-month period, as it is required under the 
law. There is no discretion for the marriage tribunal to withhold a certificate 
for wilful non-attendance. Mary Nesarajam55 in her research finds that the 
parties may come to a conciliatory body and give their respective version of 
the marital story. However, she doubts the authenticity of the information 
given by the parties in the session, which the members of the conciliatory 
bodies can neither confirm nor refute. She comments that it is beyond the 
power of the members to hold the parties to their words, as at present they 
can only trust that the parties are telling the truth. Thus, she suggests that to 
 49 Sitravelu, Mary Nesarajam, “Conciliatory Bodies in Klang and Petaling Jaya”, Academic 
Exercise, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
 50 Formal interview with members of the Marriage Tribunal, Headquarters (former NRD 





 54 Mimi Kamariah, Family Law in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 
1999, p 188.
 55 Sitravelu, Mary Nesarajam, “Conciliatory Bodies in Klang and Petaling Jaya”, Academic 
Exercise, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1983.
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ensure that the parties are truthful in their stories the LRA should be amended 
to make false declarations during reconciliation an offence similar in nature 
and punishment to that of making false oaths for procuring marriage under 
s 38 of the LRA.56
(iii)  Absence of a provision for secrecy
There is no provision for secrecy of the information given during the 
reconciliation session provided for under the LRA. In Singapore and Australia 
for example, the law has legislated on the issue of the duty of secrecy in relation 
to the admissibility of evidence of anything said in the course of reconciliation. 
Section 85(4) of the Singapore’s Women’s Charter 1961 states that evidence of 
anything said or any admission made in the course of an endeavour to effect 
a reconciliation under this section, shall not be admissible in any Court.57 
Noor Farida58 criticises that “although there are directives from the relevant 
authorities as to the necessity for secrecy, beyond a reprimand there is no 
further sanction for this provision.” She argues that the imposition of a penalty 
on members for a breach is inappropriate, the reason being the difficulty of 
enforcement. She feels that a better solution would be for the conciliatory 
bodies to draw up their own Code of Ethics and thus, suggests amendment 
in this aspect of the law.59
(iv)  Lack of publicity
The lack of publicity of the existence of the conciliatory bodies particularly 
those under the religious organisations might explain the poor attendance. 
Awang60 finds that there was no report of any case which had been referred 
to a conciliatory body of a church, temple or association for the whole of 
1991. He states the reason for this situation might be that the public were 
unaware of the conciliatory body’s existence or that they were reluctant to 
let their peers know of their marital problems.61 Stanley Lim62 explains that 
churches do carry out reconciliation efforts for their members. He points out 
 56 LRA, s 38 states:
Any person who for the purpose of procuring any marriage under this Act intentionally 
makes any false declaration or signs any false notice or certificate required by this Act 
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable in conviction to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding RM3,000 or to both.
 57 In Australia, s 12(1) of the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 provides that a marriage 
guidance counsellor is neither competent nor compellable as a witness in respect of any 
communication made to him in that capacity.
 58 Noor Farida, “Reform of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976” [1984] 1 CLJ 137.
 59 Ibid.
 60 Awang, “Reconciliation and Family Courts”, a paper presented at the Conference on Reform 
of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, IIUM, 1992, pp 3–4.
 61 Ibid. 
 62 Interview with Pastor Stanley Lim of Glad Tiding Church, Petaling Jaya, Selangor in 
November 1999.
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that due to low publicity, low number of cases were being referred to the 
churches for reconciliation. It is thus suggested that adequate publicity of the 
conciliatory bodies be provided so that the public and those involved in the 
marital conflicts are informed of their existence and functions.
(v)  Administrative problems
It is observed that the conciliatory councils appointed under s 106(3)(a) of 
the LRA are scattered all over the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and 
Petaling Jaya. There is no central location or landmark to make these bodies 
easily accessible to the public as compared to the marriage tribunals, which 
occupy permanent and centrally located buildings such as the Marriage 
Tribunal situated in the Headquarters (former NRD head quarters at Bangunan 
Persekutuan, Persiaran Barat, Jalan Sultan, 46551 Petaling Jaya, Selangor) 
and Kuala Lumpur. It is to note that the Marriage Tribunals established 
under s 106(3)(b) of the LRA is administered by the National Registration 
Department. 
With the above facts, the Federation of Women Lawyers recommends that the 
administration of the conciliatory bodies should therefore, be removed from 
the National Registration Department, where their ordinary functions do not 
normally include the type of welfare activities undertaken by the conciliatory 
bodies.63 They suggest the setting up of a Family Court in Malaysia and 
advocate that the whole system of counselling and other welfare services, 
which are essential to family matters, to become part and parcel of the Family 
Court infrastructure.64
Recommendations and suggestions
It is proposed that the marriage tribunal in the National Registration 
Department be abolished and a new unit be established in the Family Division 
of the High Court. In the United Kingdom, ministerial responsibility for 
marriage support services has been transferred from the Home Office to 
the Lord Chancellor’s Department. The proposed new unit will have the 
responsibility of implementing the relevant provisions, and having under 
its roof, the Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) mechanisms, their 
management and development. It can be called “Alternative Family Dispute 
Resolution Unit”, where mediation, counselling and other ADR mechanisms 
can be offered.
It is expected that the new unit, properly placed, will be able to formulate 
new provisions more relevant to the needs of the families and marriages in 
 63 Noor Farida, “Reform of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976” [1984] 1 CLJ 137 
at 139.
 64 Ibid. This proposal for the establishment of Family Court has been supported by many, for 
example, the Federation of Women Lawyers.
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conflict. It can also be expected to have appropriate facilities and mechanisms 
to resolve marriage conflict early with the intention of saving marriages as 
well as managing conciliatory divorce, with special attention given to the 
welfare of children. It is also expected to address the difficulties related to 
the current reconciliation provisions. This unit will be better able to plan for 
expansion and improvement of the services offered. More significantly, it will 
be able to study new ideas and innovations available worldwide should they 
be considered appropriate and relevant for incorporation into its services, 
bearing in mind that mediation concepts and practices are continuously 
changing in the Western world.
According to s 106(5) of the LRA, a conciliatory body to which a matrimonial 
difficulty has been referred shall resolve it within a period of six months. 
Although an attempt at reconciliation must be done within this six-month 
period, the provision allows, if it considers necessary, to adjourn the proceedings 
from time to time. There has been a suggestion that the above subsection 
should be amended and a discretionary clause included under it. This is to 
allow members of the institutions to use their discretion in individual cases. 
It is suggested that once it has been determined that there is no possibility 
of reconciliation between the parties the certificate should be issued at the 
earliest possible date. There is no point keeping the marriage if both parties 
have made up their minds to dissolve it.
The LRA does not state the qualification required of the members of the 
conciliatory bodies. Thus, there should be detailed provision included 
concerning the qualification of the members and also guidelines as to how to 
carry out the reconciliation and conciliation process. This is important, as the 
task of reconciling the disputes between the estranged couple should be handled 
by trained and experienced persons, as it involves counselling, skills, patience 
and knowledge. It is suggested that a team of specialists trained in marriage 
counselling be appointed. The team may include a clinical psychologist and 
a social worker and should be attached to and become permanent employees 
of the Family Division of the High Court and be available at all times to assist 
the judge of the Family Division.
Concerning the idea to establish the Family Court, perhaps, first of all, we should 
learn from the experience of those countries which have already established 
a “one-stop” centre that deals with all matrimonial proceedings and other 
services related to matrimonial causes such as counselling and mediation. 
It is interesting to note that our neighbouring country, Singapore, has set up 
its Family Court on March 1, 1995. This Family Court, in order to minimise 
the acrimony between the parties and in the interest of their children, has 
integrated mediation and counselling into the case process. Tan Puay Boon65 
 65 Tan Puay Boon, “Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Singapore Family Court System” 
(1999) XXVIII No 3, INSAF, p 166.
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finds that since the setting up of the Family Court, it has been conducting 
mediation for cases involving spousal and child maintenance, enforcement of 
maintenance orders and family violence. She considers the court’s experience 
with family mediation very encouraging and in 1996, she says, 89.7% of the 
cases were settled after mediation.66
Conclusion
O’Donovan,67 while indicating that the English practice over the decade 
had been a failure, expresses hope that Malaysia would be more successful 
than England had been! However, Rita Reddy,68 criticising the reconciliation 
provisions of the LRA as “dead provisions”, says, “the assessment after ten 
years had shown that there has to be major changes in the reconciliatory 
provisions for them to be effective”. As great effort has been made in England 
to improve this aspect of law, it is my opinion that Malaysia needs to do the 
same or even more.
 66 Ibid. Mediation is one of the services offered by the Family Court as an alternative to litigation 
and it is offered at no cost to the parties. If the Court considers that there is a possibility of 
an amicable resolution of the matter, it may, with the consent of the parties, refer the parties 
for mediation. A trained mediator facilitates the discussion between the parties and assists 
them to generate options. But the parties make their own decision. The resulting settlement 
is recorded before a judge, who ensures that the parties understand the effect of the order 
and are prepared to abide by it. See, Tan Puay Boon, “Alternative Dispute Resolution in the 
Singapore Family Court System” (1999) XXVIII No 3, INSAF, p 167.
 67 O’Donovan, K, “Conciliation and Reconciliation on Divorce in Hooker” MB (ed), Malaysian 
Legal Essays in Honour of Professor Emeritus Datuk Ahmad Ibrahim, Malayan Law Journal Sdn 
Bhd, 1986.
 68 Reddy, Rita, “Reconciliation and Family Court”, a paper presented at the Conference on 
the Reform of Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976, IIUM, 1992.
